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Abstract  
7KLVVWXG\HVWLPDWHVDJHQF\¶VLPSDFWRQVXJDUSODQWDWLRQSURGXFWLYLW\XVLQJDXQLTXHearly 19th 
century panel data set from St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Results of fixed effects  models,  
combined  with  a  qualitative  and  quantitative  analysis  of  potential endogeneity of the agency 
variable, provide no evidence that estates managed by agents were less productive than those 
managed by their owners.  We discuss the results in the context of the historical and recent,  
revisionary,  interpretations of agency and the emergence of managerial hierarchies in the 
Atlantic economy.  
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7KHWKHPHRIµ7KHSHULOVRIDJHQF\¶LVDUHFXUUHQWRQHLQWKHKLVWRULRJUDSK\RI&DULEEHDQ 
slavery. This literature has two main branches: an older, censorious view and a more recent,  
revisionist  perspective. Criticisms of  managerial  abuses  first  appear  in  contemporary  
SXEOLFDWLRQVVXFKDV(GZDUG/RQJ¶VDFFRXQWRI-DPDLFD/RQJ0RGHUQVFKRODUVKLSbegins 
with Frank Pitman (1927) and Lowell Ragatz (1931), who associated non-residency and agency with 
DJUDULDQFRQVHUYDWLVPDQGHFRQRPLFQHJOHFW(ULF:LOOLDPV¶IDPRXVPRQRJUDSKCapitalism and 
SlaveryOLNHZLVHGHSLFWVDEVHQWHHODQGORUGLVPDVµWKHFXUVHRIWKH&DULEEHDQ¶resulting in estate 
mismanagement and other abuses (Williams, 1944). These contentions are repeated in numerous 
later studies, including David Watts (1987).  
Revisionist critics object that the causes and consequences of absenteeism were varied, that  
the ranks of non-resident owners included progressive agriculturalists, and that estates managed  
by agents continued to be profitable (Hall, 1964; Ward, 1988; Burnard, 2004). Apologists for  
DJHQF\DOVRSRLQWRXWWKDWVXJDUFXOWLYDWLRQ¶VVFDOHFRPSOH[LW\DQGFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\SURYLGHG 
incentives to develop management and accountancy systems, regardless of whether an owner  
continued to reside in the West Indies, or opted to become an absentee (Sheridan, 1971; Green,  
:DUG&RZWRQDQG2¶6KDXJKQHVV\&RRNH)OHLVFKPDQ$Q 
important contribution by Barry Higman (2005), based on two Jamaican case studies, has  
boosted revisionism significantly. Rejecting much contemporary criticism of estate managers as  
unfounded, Higman recasts absenteeism as an agency problem capable of solution through the  
development of recognizably modern management hierarchies.  In his view, the desire to  
maintain professional reputations, underpinned by efficient contract design, reconciled the  
interests of planters and agents. For Higman, attorneys coerced greater amounts of labor from  
the enslaved, generating the levels of output needed to sustain non-residency. µ,WZDVWKH 
PDQDJHPHQWSUDFWLFHGE\DWWRUQH\V¶KHFRQFOXGHVµWKDWVTXHH]HGWKHPD[LPXPSRVVLEOH 
SURGXFWIURPWKHV\VWHPDQGWKHSHRSOHLWRSSUHVVHG¶+LJPDQ05, p. 279-83).  
A major weakness of the existing literature is that it lacks explicit comparison of the  
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productivity of estates managed by agents and those directed by their owners.  An important  
reason for this omission lies in the fact that Jamaican sources, on which the majority of research  
is based, lack widespread information about owner-operated plantations (Higman, 1976).  
Unable to measure productivity directly, Higman instead examined the likelihood that an estate 
would cease production after the legal abolition of slavery in 1833. He reports that Jamaican 
properties under attorney-ship in 1832 were less prone to failure by 1847. As Higman points out, 
however, most abandoned estates owned by residents possessed small workforces and were located in 
PDUJLQDODUHDV6XJDUHVWDWHVXQGHUDWWRUQH\VLQFRQWUDVWµRFFXSLHGWKHEHVWVLWHVDQGZHUHRQ
DYHUDJHPRUHSURGXFWLYHDQGSURILWDEOH¶+LJPDQS-83). In consequence, the evidence 
of survivorship does not permit conclusions to be drawn about the relative productivity of 
agent-operated estates during the period of slavery itself.  
Other studies of slavery in the Caribbean and United States demonstrate awareness of similar 
problems. Investigations of the relative efficiency of slave and free labor in the antebellum cotton 
South, for example, suggest that scale is correlated with productivity-augmenting characteristics, 
including location (soil type, relief, and climate) and managerial structures.  Alan Olmstead and 
Paul Rhode (2008) report that plantation fixed effects are strong determinants of cotton picking 
productivity. The wider literature emphasizes the difficulty of separating the effects of managerial 
inputs and structural characteristics on agricultural efficiency. Structural effects can be decomposed 
into on-farm and off-farm factors. The former include location and size; the latter upstream and 
downstream relations with suppliers and purchasers that, in turn, affect credit relations and debt 
financing (van Passel et al., 2006, p. 3-6).  
The possibility of undertaking an analysis of the productivity of plantations on St. Vincent  
and the Grenadines (SVG) has, hitherto, escaped notice. Britain acquired SVG from France at the  
HQGRIWKH6HYHQ<HDUV¶:DU-63), during the middle phase of European imperial expansion  
LQWKH&DULEEHDQ+LJPDQ)RUPRVWRIWKHSHULRGIURPWRWKHFRORQ\¶V  
plantations ranked second in the British West Indies after Jamaica, producing, on average, 7.8  
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percent of total sugar output (Watts, 1987). Previous appraisals of agency in SVG are strongly  
critical, reflecting the influence of the older literature (Spinelli, 1973; Marshall, 2007). These  
studies do not, however, subject the hypothesis of an agency penalty to rigorous testing: their  
evidence is selective and includes counter-examples of poor management by resident planters.  
Contemporary sources similarly allege that malpractice occurred on some properties. Absentee  
+XJK3HUU\.HDQHFRPSODLQHGRIµWKHYLOODLQRXVPLVPDQDJHPHQWRIP\(VWDWH¶DQGYLVLWHG6W 
Vincent twice to improve conditions on Liberty Lodge.1 A second non-resident owner, James  
Adam Gordon, sent a special visiting attorney to inspect his Fairhall property in 1824.  The  
VXEVHTXHQWUHSRUWVVKDUSO\FULWLFL]HGWKHHVWDWH¶VPDQDJHPHQW6PLWK+RZHYHUGHVSLWH 
their detail, these are only two examples. The interpretive weight they can carry is limited.  
This paper uses a panel data set comprising estates from SVG to estimate the effect of agent  
RSHUDWLRQRQHVWDWHSURGXFWLYLW\7ZRSULQFLSDOVRXUFHVDUHXVHG,QIRUPDWLRQDERXWDQHVWDWH¶V 
DJHQF\VWDWXVLVGHULYHGIURPWKHµUHJLVWU\UHWXUQV¶FRPSXOVRU\UHJLVWULHVRIVOave ownership in  
the British West Indies which were introduced between 1812 and 1819 to police enforcement of  
the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and to regulate inter-colonial movements of slaves  
(Higman, 1984). The person making these returQVZDVUHTXLUHGWRGHFODUHµWKHULJKWRUFKDUDFWHU 
in which the party making such Return holds possession of and claims title to such Slave or  
Slaves, namely whether as Proprietor, Lessee, Mortgagee, Sequestrator, Guardian, Committee,  
Trustee, Receiver, ([HFXWRU$GPLQLVWUDWRU$WWRUQH\RURWKHUZLVH¶/DZVRI6W9LQFHQW 
'DWDIRUHVWDWHRXWSXWDQGLQSXWVDUHREWDLQHGIURPWKHµFURSUHWXUQV¶WKHSULPDU\SXUSRVHRI 
ZKLFKZDVWRDVVHVVSODQWHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHSDULVKOHY\/DZVRI6W9LQFHQW0DSV 
of the Greater Caribbean Region and SVG are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  
Analysis proceeds in two stages. Firstly, for the years 1801-1829, descriptive statistics are  
used to summarize trends in output and the number and proportion of estates on SVG that were  
1Diary of Hugh Perry Keane, Virginia Historical Society, Keane Family Papers, Mss 1 K197 a15 [1803],  
endnotes.  
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operated by owners and managed by agents. These show that, over the period in question, SVG 
underwent a process of consolidation: the total number of estates on the islands fell by about a 
third, with smaller, owner-operated estates, based predominantly on the Grenadines and 
producing minor crops such as cotton, ceasing production.  The number of slaves remained 
reasonably constant over this period and the proportion of estates operated by agents increased. 
Secondly, for the sugar plantations, we estimate the effect of agent operation on estate output for 
the years 1814-1829 to assess whether management by agents inflicted a penalty on estate 
performance by reducing output or estate revenue.  
In contrast to existing studies that have tried to estimate the causal effect of a treatment  
variable on agricultural output (see, for example, Christopher Udry (1996), who investigated  
gender effects on yields for farm households in Burkina Faso), we face a number of difficulties in  
estimating the econometric models. Firstly, there is the problem of unobservable heterogeneity.  
As noted by Higman (2005), estates are likely to differ according to unmeasured, output-related  
factors such as soil quality, elevation, climate and so on, which may be correlated with agency  
status. Secondly, there is the possibility of reverse causality in the relationship between output  
and agency. Estate owners are likely to have made decisions about whether to manage estates  
themselves or via an agent according to past and anticipated levels of plantation output and  
revenue. Some evidence to support this possibility appears in the historical literature. Kenneth  
0RUJDQREVHUYHVWKDWµ>%@\WKHWLPHRIWKH1DSROHRQLF:DUVDVXFFHVVIXO:HVW,QGLD 
pODQWHUWHQGHGWREHDQDEVHQWHHRQH¶+LJPDQQRWHVWKDWRQFH-DPDLFDQHVWDWHV 
reached a threshold size of 1,000 acres or 250 slaves, owners were liable to hand control to an  
agent and retire to Britain.  
To address the first of these problems - unmeasured, time-invariant, heterogeneity across  
estates - we estimate a series of fixed effects panel data models using both estate output and estate  
revenue as dependent variables and contrast these with the results of pooled models estimated by  
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OLS which ignore the fixed effects.2 To address the potential endogeneity of the agency variable,  
we carry out a qualitative and quantitative analysis of estates on which the owner died leaving no  
QDWXUDOVXFFHVVRU,IWKHGHDWKRIRZQHUVLQWKLVPDQQHUUHVXOWHGLQWKHµDVLI¶UDQGRPDOORFDWLRQ 
of estate operation to agents, then examination of the output profiles of estates on which these  
owners died can give some clues as to whether agent operation caused poorer estate productivity.  
We also use the death of owners in this manner to instrument the agency variable, in an attempt  
to recover a corrected estimate of the impact of agency on the dependent variables of interest.  
However, this approach comes with its own set of problems, notably the limited overall number  
of estates and the small number of estates on which such deaths occurred.  
Comparison of the results of the pooled models with those of the fixed effects models  
suggests strongly that time-invariant estate-level heterogeneity should be controlled for.  The  
resulting fixed effects models provide no evidence that the productivity of agent-operated  
estates was worse than those estates that were owner-operated, nor is there evidence to suggest  
that productivity was better. These results are supported by our attempts to address the potential  
problem of endogeneity of the agency variable. We conclude that there is no evidence in our  
data set to suggest that estates managed by agents were less productive than those operated by  
WKHLURZQHUV7KHUHVXOWVWKHUHIRUHOHQGVXSSRUWWR+LJPDQ¶VDQGRWKHUUHYLVLRQLVWV¶DWWHPSWVDW 
rehabilitating the reputation of Caribbean agents for the region and period in question.  
 
Sources of data and descriptive analysis  
Our data set encompasses the years 1801 to 1829, with no data available for the years 1825 and  
1826 and limited information available for 1801-1803. The data set is compiled from two main  
VRXUFHV7KHµFURSUHWXUQV¶ZKLFKFRYHUWKH\HDUV-1824 and 1827-1829) record annual  
2Ideally, we would wish also to include the profit of estates as a dependent variable, but cost data is not available  
to us.  
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declarations of slave numbers, estate size in acres, crop outputs and details of land ownership  
at the time the source was compiled.  The slave numbers recorded are numbers owned, not  
numbers employed; the sources do not offer breakdowns by employment category. Nor is the  
use of temporary hired slave labor detailed. In the appendix, we argue that the use of jobbing  
gangs and other hired labor on SVG was less prevalent than in the case of other sugar producing  
FRORQLHVWKHUHE\DGGLQJWRWKHVXLWDELOLW\RI69*DVDFDVHVWXG\7KHµUHJLVWU\UHWXUQV¶DUH 
official documents monitoring the numbers of slaves on plantations in the years 1817, 1821,  
1824, 1827, and 1830.3  
    The crop returns are in three formats. Firstly, a manuscript pocket book listing output of estates on 
SVG between 1801 and 1814, including ownership information in 1814, accessioQHGZLWKµ$Q
Almanack Calculated IRUWKH,VODQGRI6W9LQFHQW¶4  Secondly, a printed book covering the 
years 1801-1818 and 1819-1824. This includes information on ownership in 1818 and 1824 and is 
HQWLWOHGµ$Q$FFRXQWRIWKH1XPEHURI6ODYHV(PSOR\HGDQG4XDQWLW\RI3URGXFH*URZQRQ 
the Several Estates in the Island of Saint Vincent and its Dependencies, from the year 1801 to  
1818; and from WKDWSHULRGWRLQFOXVLYH¶5  Lastly, a further printed book detailing crop returns 
for 1827-1829, including ownership information in 1829.6  Crop return data are not available for  
the Grenadines prior to 1804.  
The crop returns list estates by owner, together with annual crop output and information  
about the number of slaves, on pain of a penalty of £50 currency (Laws of St. Vincent, 1884,  
200-14). A consolidating law enacted in 1821 required that these returns be submitted between  
the 1st and the 15th of January each year and so a date of 31st January is assumed for all crop  
returns. We further assume that the recorded owner refers to the owner of the estate at the time  
3 The National Archives: Public Record Office. Information from the registry return for 1830 is matched to the crop 
return of 1829.  
4Kingstown: St. Vincent, 1808 and 1809, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes  
House, University of Oxford, RHO Retro Staff.  
5Compiled from the official returns. (Kingstown: St. Vincent, 1825). 
6From Shephard (1831, appendix, vi-xxvi).  
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the source was compiled, unless the estate ceased production before this date, in which case 
ownership information is deemed to refer to the owner of the estate at the last date for which 
output information for that estate is available.  
The registry returns record the names of owners, returners and details of slave numbers. That of 
1817 is a full census of the enslaved population. Returns for 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1830 list 
between-registry UHWXUQDGGLWLRQVPDLQO\ELUWKVDQGORVVHVPDLQO\GHDWKVWRHDFKHVWDWH¶V
population. The registry returns of 1817, 1821, 1827 and 1830 record agency status.7  
Taken together, these sources permit us to construct a panel data set with which to investigate  
whether agency adversely impacted the productivity of estates.  For each sugar plantation in  
each calendar year between 1814 and 1829 (inclusive), the output of sugar, molasses, rum, the  
number of slaves on the estate, total acreage, and agency status were recorded, where available.  
Information on output and slaves is available in all years except 1825 and 1826. Information on  
acreage is available intermittently in all three of the crop return sources mentioned at the start of  
this section.  
In creating the merged data set, the registry return data are mapped to the nearest crop return. 
So agency data from the registry return for 1817 are mapped to the crop return for 1817 because the 
registry return (dated 27th March 1817) is nearest to the crop return of that year (31st January 
1817).  Agency data for the remaining registry returns (dated 31st December 1821,31st December 
1824, 31st December 1827 and 31st December 1830) are mapped to the nearest crop return (31st 
January following).  
The resulting, merged, data set contains, for the years 1814 to 1829 inclusive, an almost  
complete run of sugar output and slave numbers for each estate (1825 and 1826 excepted), with  
some missing values for acreage and agency status. An estate is defined as being operated by an  
7Comparison of the registry return data for 1827 with the crop return for that year suggests that a small number of  
non-VXJDUSURGXFLQJHVWDWHVUHFRUGHGDVRSHUDWLQJLQWKHUHJLVWU\UHWXUQZHUHQRWWDEXODWHGLQ6KHSKDUG¶VFURS 
return account. Most likely, these estates ceased operations prior to 1829, when Shephard compiled his information.  
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agent when the registry return lists the returner as a manager, attorney or agent, trustee, executor,  
guardian or receiver/administrator, or tenant. If this information is not available, an estate is  
classified as being operated by an agent when the registry return records a name for the owner  
that is not the same as that of the returner or when it is possible to identify an agent from a  
previous or subsequent registry return. An estate is classified as being operated by an owner if  
the returner is classified as the owner, or if comparison within estates, over time, suggests this to  
be the case.  
To fill in as many missing values as possible, we carried out an extensive review of the estate  
profiles and other sources. The most common reason for filling in missing values for the agency  
variable was when the names of the owners (and managers, where appropriate) of an estate were  
unchanged between two years in which they were recorded. We filled in missing values for estate  
acreage when they fell between years in which a constant estate acreage was recorded. Online  
Supplementary Material provides additional information, including details of the data set used  
to derive the results, which is made publicly available, and a summary of missing data.  
Based on a comparison of the data set with the number of slaves recorded in the census  
years of 1817 and 1825, we estimate that it includes approximately 83 percent of the enslaved  
inhabitants on SVG. The remaining 17 percent were based in the port city of Kingstown and  
smaller settlements, working in crafts or domestic service outside the plantation sector.  
The rest of this section contains a general description of estate characteristics and trends for the 
period 1801-1829, based on 4163 observations on 215 estates. The econometric analysis uses sugar 
estates only, for the period 1814-1829. As a result, the sample size for the econometric analysis, at 
1454 observations on 108 sugar estates, is smaller.  
Figures 3 and 4 plot the total number of estates and slaves on the islands between 1801 and  
1829, broken down by estate location (St. Vincent or the Grenadines). Three key events are  
noted: (a) the closure of the transatlantic slave trade in 1807; (b) the volcanic eruption of 1812  
GHVFULEHGLQ6PLWKDQGFDµWUDGHVKRFN¶LQZKHQUHVWULFWLRQVRQ:HVW,QGLHV 
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exports to the United States were relaxed.  The story told by the two figures is one of 
consolidation:  smaller, owner-operated estates, based predominantly on the Grenadines and 
producing minor crops such as cotton, ceased production. The total number of estates declined over 
the period, from 148 in 1804 to 109 in 1829, but the number of slaves remained reasonably constant 
(20195 in 1804, falling to 19380 by 1829). In 1804, St. Vincent had approximately 
two-and-a-half times the number of estates than the Grenadines; by 1829, it had approximately 
seven times as many. Almost all of the estates on St. Vincent produced sugar. The number of slaves 
working for agents remained stable over time.  
Although the number of estates operated by agents was largely unchanged during the period  
of investigation, the percentage of agent-operated estates increased (from 59 percent in 1817 to  
74 percent in 1829) owing to the decline in the total number of estates. Figure 5 shows that the  
total output of sugar produced by agents, and the total estate acreage operated by agents, also  
increased between 1817 and 1827 (the period for which the most reliable agency and acreage  
information is available), while the total estate acreage managed by owners and the output of  
sugar produced by owners declined (the data series for sugar output have very low levels of  
missing data; those for estate acreage have higher levels and are therefore less trustworthy).  
Owners typically possessed a single estate and agents typically managed a single property.  
Owners and agents were also distinct groups: few owners ever acted as agents and vice versa.  
Data from the registry return of 1817 show that, when estates are compared according to agency  
type, there is little difference between the gender ratio (the proportions of male slaves on owner- 
and agent-operated estates are equal at 0.51), the average ages of males and females (26 years  
for owner operated estates and 27 years for agent-operated estates) and the proportion of slaves  
assigned to skilled occupations (0.15 on owner-operated estates and 0.13 on agent-operated  
estates).  
Figure 6 plots the output of sugar, rum, and molasses over time (note that the vertical scales  
in Figures 6(a) and (b) differ). Sugar output declined on both locations between 1805 and 1812.  
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Thereafter, levels recovered but remained more volatile on the Grenadines, most likely due to  
greater variation in annual rainfall. The share of the three major staples grown on the smaller  
islands remained at around 10 percent. The minor staples of coffee and cocoa were confined to St.  
Vincent and cotton was produced only on the Grenadines. Analysis of the revenues generated  
by sugar, rum and molasses shows that they accounted for around 9SHUFHQWRIWKHFRORQ\¶V 
exports in 1804 and 98.5 percent in 1824. In summary, sugar and sugar-related crops dominated  
production on the islands.  
After 1822, rum production fell sharply in both locations, while molasses output increased.  
This shift from rum to molasses reflects advantageous trading conditions favoring the export  
of crude molasses as opposed to the distillation of rum. Export data for 1822, 1824, and 1827- 
9 show that molasses were chiefly exported to Britain (82 percent market share), with North  
$PHULFDDQGWKH86$SURYLGLQJDVHFRQGDU\RXWOHWSHUFHQW,QFRQWUDVWUXP¶VODUJHVWPDUNHW 
was North America and the USA (50 percent), with Britain occupying a supplementary position  
(27 percent share). A fall in the price of rum relative to molasses, coupled with the lifting of  
restraints on British-U.S. trade in 1822, boosted exports of molasses to the USA (Gayer et al.,  
1953, p. 674-9, 719-20, 729-30; Ragatz, 1927, p. 9-10; Cole, 1938; Davidson, 1900, p. 33-34).  
 
Estimating agenc\¶VHIIHFWRQHVWDWHRXWSXWDQGUHYHQXH 
 
Labelling the N estates by i, i = 1, ...,N, and calendar year by t, the general equation under 
consideration is:  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ܣ݃݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ߛ ൅ ࢞௜௧ࢼ ൅ ݒ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ .                  (1) ݕ௜௧ is the output or revenue measure of interest for estate݅ in year ݐ (either the output of sugar,  
measured in hogsheads, or estate revenue, measured in £, from the sale of sugar, molasses and  
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rum).  ܣ݃݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ is equal to one if estate ݅ is operated by an agent in year ݐ and zero if it is  
operated by its owner, ߠ௧ is a year intercept effect and, when used, factors of production (the  
number of slaves and estate acreage) are included in ࢞௜௧, which has coefficient vector ࢼ. ݒ௜ is  
intended to capture time-invariant, estate-level, unobserved effects such as quality of land,  
altitude, climate and so on, which are potentially correlated with both output and the other  
explanatory variables.  ߳௜௧ is an idiosyncratic disturbance.  ߛ measures the difference in the  
average value of the dependent variable between agents and owners, controlling for the other  
regressors. The aim of the econometric analysis is to test the null hypothesis that ߛ is equal to  
zero, that is, conditional upon the values of other explanatory variables, there is no difference in  
the productivity of agent- and owner-operated estates.  We test this null at the 5 percent  
significance level using a two-tailed test, thereby considering statistically significant departures  
from zero in a positive or negative direction as providing evidence of, respectively, an agency or  
owner premium.  
Our econometric analysis starts with a comparison of the results of the estimation of Eq.  
ZKLFKZHFDOOWKHµ2/6-IL[HGHIIHFWV¶2/6-)(PRGHOZLWKWKHHVWLPDWLRQRIµSRROHG¶ 
versions of Eq. (1) which omit the estate-level effects, ݒ௜, and include instead controls for estate  
location, defined as the parish in which the estate operated (for estates on St. Vincent) or the  
island on which the estate operated. We do this for two specifications, a parsimonious one which  
regresses ݕ௜௧ on only the agency and calendar year variables, and one which estimates a Cobb- 
Douglas production function, regressing the natural logarithm of ݕ௜௧ on the same regressors plus  
the natural logarithms of both the number of slaves on the estate and the acreage of the estate.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for this analysis. The data set for the regressions of output  
on agency status alone, controlling for calendar year, spans 1814-1829 and comprises 1454  
observations on 108 estates. Of these 108 estates, 49 were always operated by agents, 13 were  
always operated by owners and 46 changed ownership regime (8 switched from agent- to owner- 
operation, 27 from owner- to agent-operation, and 11 estates witnessed multiple switches). The  
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data set that is used to estimate the Cobb-Douglas production functions covers the years 1817- 
1827 and comprises 853 observations on the same 108 estates. Observations are lost in this case 
because of missing acreage data before 1817 and after 1827.  
The number of slaves on an estate ranges from 17 to 689, the size of estates from 30 to 1992  
acres, sugar output from four hogsheads to over 800 and estate revenue from £155 to £50,602.  
Restricting the period of investigation for the Cobb-Douglas models does not change the sample  
means and standard deviations of the variables to any great degree. Table 1 also breaks down  
the size, revenue and output of estates by agency status. Consistent with the observations of  
Morgan (2007) and Higman (1996, 2005), agent-operated estates were larger, on average, than  
owner-operated ones and produced higher average volumes of sugar and revenue.  
The advantage of using estate revenue instead of the output of sugar as the dependent variable  
LVWKDWLWPRGHOVDQHVWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRSURGXFHWKHFRUUHFWµPL[¶RIRXWSXWVJLYHQWKHLUUHODWLYH 
prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The downside is that it requires the use of an appropriate  
price series, and sugar and its related crops were sold in various markets, including Britain, the  
United States and British colonies within the Americas. We chose as a revenue output measure  
the sum of the value of the sugar, rum and molasses output at constant London prices for domestic  
and imported goods (using the Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz wholesale commodity price index as a  
deflator, see Mitchell (1988)).  
Results of the pooled and OLS-FE models are shown in Table 2 (crop year effects are not  
reported). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the estate in all models. The results of the  
pooled models show a large,  positive and statistically significant coefficient on agency,  
suggesting that estates operated by agents had higher average levels of sugar output and revenue  
than those operated by their owners.  However, the OLS-FE results show that this effect  
disappears when the estate-level fixed effects replace the location effects: only two of the four  
OLS-FE models in Table 2 suggest a beneficial impact of agent operation on output, but  
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estimates of the agency premium, at around 0.2 percent, are small in size8 and none are  
statistically significant at traditional levels.9  This contrast between the agency effect for the  
pooled and the OLS-FE models is evidence that agents were found on estates that were more  
productive, on average:  omitting estate-level effects in the pooled models, and controlling  
instead for parish or island location only, leads to upward bias in the parameter estimate for  
agency.  
Regarding the additional covariates that are included in the Cobb-Douglas OLS-FE models,  
the evidence suggests decreasing returns to both factors of production (estimated elasticities for  
the number of slaves are 0.17 and 0.23 in the output and revenue models, respectively; those for  
estate acreage are 0.13 and 0.18). Tests that the sum of the parameter estimates for the factors  
of production are equal to one (not reported) are rejected, suggesting decreasing returns to scale.  
The higher R2s for the revenue models suggest that they fit the data better than the output models.  
The inclusion of estate-level fixed effects is intended to control for one form of endogeneity,  
that relating to omitting time-invariant confounding factors at the level of the estate that are  
correlated with both the agency variable and the dependent variable. However, this is not the  
only kind of endogeneity that may be present. For example, as described earlier, Higman (1996,  
2005) and Morgan (2007) note that larger estates were more likely to be operated by agents, with  
the owner living in Great Britain. That agents tended to be found on larger estates is supported by  
the summary statistics reported in Table 1. If agency status in one year is partially determined by  
estate output in previous years, then the agency variable is endogenous and parameter estimates  
for the effect of agency on output will be biased and inconsistent even in the presence of the  
fixed estate-level and calendar year effects. The same is true for the variables representing the  
factors of production: feedback from output in one year to changes in the chosen combinations  
8For the estimates of Ȗ in the Cobb-Douglas models, the approximate percentage effect of agent operation on output 
is calculated as 100(eȖ í 1).  
9Statistical significance is labelled for the following significance levels: 10 percent (+), 5 percent (*), 1 percent  
(**), 0.1 percent (***).  
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used in future years will mean that these too are endogenous. In the analysis which follows, we  
concentrate on the most parsimonious models - those which omit the factors of production - and  
use a combination of approaches to try to identify the effect of agent operation on the dependent  
variable.  
Figure 7, which shows the levels of sugar output over time, together with regime switches,  
for four estates, highlights the problem of potential endogeneity owing to reverse causality for  
agency. Rabacca is owner-operated until 1818, when an agent takes over. Its output profile fits  
well with the idea that successful owners handed over the management of their estates to agents:  
the estate is large and output grows during the years in which it is managed by its owner, prior  
to an agent taking over. Cane Wood is agent-operated until 1818, when it switches to owner- 
operation. Friendship is also operated by an agent until 1818, it is owner-operated between 1819  
and 1824 before switching back to agent operation. The reasons for the regime switches for these  
three estates are not known. In contrast, the final estate, Coumacrabou, is managed by its owner,  
George Young, until he died in 1822 leaving no successor to take over estate management, so  
that an agent was appointed.  
In addition to Coumacrabou, we were able to identify seven other estates upon which an  
owner who was operating the estate died leaving no successor to take over the estate management.  
7KHLUSURILOHVDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUHVDDQGE%HOYHGHUH¶VRZQHUVKLSZDVGLVSXWHGLQ 
and 1818, following the death of one of the joint owners, and our best assessment of the sources  
is that it was operated by an agent during this time, after which it was operated by its owner, John  
0F&DXOZKRGLHGLQOHDYLQJQRVXFFHVVRU7KHUHLVDµGLS¶LQRXWSXWWKDWDFFRPSDQLHV 
the switch from owner-managed to agent-operated upon the death of John McCaul, after which  
output recovers. On Golden Vale, Kingstown Park and Kingswood, the appointment of an agent  
following the death of the owner leaving no natural successor appears to make little difference to  
output levels. For Rose Bank and Reversion, average output is higher following the death of the  
owner and appointment of the agent.  
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2YHUDOOSXWWLQJDVLGHWKHµGLS¶LQRXWSXWZKLFKIROORZVWKHGHDWKRIVRPHRZQHUVZKROHIW 
no heir to take over the operation of the estate, there is little evidence in Figures 7 to 8(b) that  
the change to agent operation harmed output following such deaths.  If the deaths of owners  
OHDYLQJQRQDWXUDOVXFFHVVRURFFXUUHGLQDQµDVLI¶UDQGRPPDQQHUWKDWLVWKH\FDQEHFRQVLGHUHG 
to be exogenous in the context of the estimation of Eq. (1), there would be the potential to  
carry out an instrumental variables analysis to estimate a causal effect for agent operation on  
output. This would need to condition on any direct effect on output that a death might bring to  
an estate, as evidenced by the µGLS¶ZKLFKLVREVHUYHGIRUVRPHHVWDWHV7KHLGHDRIXVLQJGHDWK 
as an instrumental variable is not new, as work by Laksmhi Iyer (2010) and Paul Frijters, David  
Johnston and Michael Shields (2014) shows.10 However, IV analysis is biased in small samples,  
which poses a problem for our analysis given that we observe only eight estates in which such a  
switch of management regime took place, and we have only 108 estates in total in our sample.  
Nevertheless, to provide a quantitative assessment of the story told in Figures 7 to 8(b), we  
defined the variable DiedNoSuccessoritµ2ZQHUKDVGLHGOHDYLQJQRQDWXUDOVXFFHVVRU¶HTXDO 
to one if the owner of an estate had died leaving no natural successor in a previous year, and  
equal to zero otherwise. We reestimated Eq. (1) replacing Agencyit with DiedNoSuccessorit,  
together with dummy variables for the year of death and the year following death, to control for  
any direct effects on output induced by the death of the owner. We did this for the subsample  
10In her cross-sectional study, Iyer (2010) investigated the impact of 19th century British rule in India on the  
SRVWFRORQLDOHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHRILWVUHJLRQV6KHXVHGWKH\HDUVVSDQQLQJ/RUG'DOKRXVLH¶Vµ'RFWULQHRI 
/DSVH¶SROLF\GXULQJZKLFKWKH%Uitish annexed native states where the ruler died without a natural heir.  Iyer  
UHVWULFWHGKHUVDPSOHWRVWDWHVZKLFKDWWKHVWDUWRI/RUG'DOKRXVLH¶VUXOHZHUHQRWDQQH[HGE\WKH%ULWLVKEHFDXVH 
those that had already been annexed were believed to be a selected sample of high-performing states) and treated the  
deaths of rulers of states without a natural heir during the period of the Doctrine of Lapse as an instrumental variable  
(IV) for British rule. Using longitudinal data, Frijters et al. (2014) used the recent death of a close friend as an IV  
to estimate the causal effect of mental health on labor market participation. In both studies, the argument used by  
the authors is that death induces exogenous variation in the endogenous treatment variable (British rule in the case  
of Iyer, mental health state in the case of Frijters) while not, itself, directly impacting on the dependent variable.  
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of the 42 estates that were operated by their owners when first observed, the idea being that these 
UHSUHVHQWDµQRQ-WUHDWHG¶VXEVDPSOHRIWKHRYHUDOOVDPSOHZKHUHE\µWUHDWPHQW¶ZHPHDQµRSHUDWHG
E\DQDJHQW¶ 
Results of the estimation of this model are reported in columns 3 and 7 of Table 3, and show  
that the death of an owner leaving no natural successor led to an estimated increase in  
output/revenue which was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. With the caveats  
about instrumental variables analysis in mind, we also report the results of an instrumental  
variable analysis using the same subsample, in which the agency variable in Eq. (1) is  
instrumented by the variable DiedNoSuccessorit using two stage least squares (2SLS).11 It is the  
case that, in the subsample of interest, all estates on which the owner died leaving no natural  
successor switched to agent operation, but some estates for which the owner did not die leaving  
QRQDWXUDOVXFFHVVRUµFURVVHG-RYHU¶IUom being operated by their owners to being agent  
operated, for reasons unknown.  
Table 3 reports the results of these models in columns 4 (first stage regression of Agency  
on DiedNoSuccessor for both the output and revenue models), 5 (second stage regression for  
the output model) and 8 (second stage regression for the revenue model). The OLS-FE results  
for this subsample are reported in columns 2 and 6. Compared with the OLS/FE results, the  
parameter estimates for agency in the IV models change sign, from negative to positive, but do  
not become statistically significant. These results should be treated with caution for the reasons  
given above. Considered alongside the estate profiles plotted in Figures 7 to 8(b), there is no  
11Two-stage least squares took fitted values for Agency obtained from the first stage regression  ܣ݃݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ ൌ ܦ݅݁݀ܰ݋ܵݑܿܿ݁ݏݏ݋ݎ௜௧ߜ ൅ ݔ௜௧ߠ ൅ ߮௜ ൅ ߪ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧,  (2) 
in which߮௜ is the estate-level fixed effect, ߪ௧  the year effect, ݔ௜௧  is as defined in Eq. (1), ݁௜௧  is the error term and ߜ and ߠ are parameters. The fitted values from this regression are then used in place of ܣ݃݁݊ܿݕ௜௧ in Eq. (1). Dummy variables 
for the year of death and the year following the death of an owner leaving no natural successor are included as regressors in 
these models, to control for any direct effect of death on output.  
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suggestion that agent operation harmed estate output and revenue.12  
We conclude with a brief analysis of alternative specifications, and whether results are 
sensitive to them. Firstly, we investigated the robustness of the results in Table 3 to dropping the small 
number of estates which are not observed for the full period of investigation. Secondly, we tested for 
an island-specific trend by interacting the two dummy variables for the islands of Bequia and 
Mustique with the dummy variables for calendar year and including these as additional 
regressors in Eq. (1). Thirdly, we reclassified estates from agent to owner operated where the owner 
and returner were different people but shared the same surname, in case there was a family tie which 
PHDQWWKDWWKHµDJHQW¶FRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHDMRLQWRZQHU1RQHRIthese changes made a major 
difference to our results.  
 
Discussion  
7KHWZREUDQFKHVRIWKHµSHULOVRIDJHQF\¶OLWHUDWXUHWKDWZHUHGLVFXVVHGLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQFDQ 
now be revisited in the light of our results.  Following the conclusion of the 2nd Carib War  
(1795/96), the last remaining tracts of land on the windward side of St. Vincent were brought  
into cultivation, closing the agricultural frontier of SVG. Thereafter, new sugar estates could only  
be created through merging or sub-dividing existing properties, or discontinuing minor staples,  
as cane cultivation entered its mature phase. The opportunity for industrious settlers to become  
12Useful information on whHWKHUGHDWKVRIRZQHUVXVLQJQRQDWXUDOVXFFHVVRURFFXUUHGLQDQµDVLI¶UDQGRPmanner 
would come from information on cause of death. Although the sources used to construct our data set do not contain the 
causes of death of owners, the most reliable source, for troops stationed in the region, suggests that the crude death rate 
was between 68 and 113 per 1,000 per year during the period spanned by our research (Curtin, 1989) and that deaths 
mDLQO\RFFXUUHGEHFDXVHRIµIHYHUV¶- exposure to tropical diseases (especially yellow fever and malaria) - for which 
Europeans had limited or no natural immunity. We also investigated whether the deaths of owners on these eight estates 
were associated with output or slave levels, by regressing an indicator variable equal to one when such a death occurred on 
the first, second and third lags of output and slave numbers, controlling for fixed estate effects. There was no evidence of 
an association.  
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planters, therefore, receded. By the early nineteenth century, the mean age of owners lay between 52 
and 54 years, reflecting the tendency of planters to acquire estates through inheritance or 
marriage and hold distant assets as absentees, habitually resident in the United Kingdom (Smith, 
2013). Our basic descriptive analysis of the data set shows that agents tended to be in charge of 
estates that were larger, and the large bias showing an agency premium that is reported in the 
pooled models disappears when fixed estate-level effects are included. These results lend support to 
the findings of Morgan (2007) and Higman (1996, 2005), namely, that agents tended to be employed 
on the larger, more successful, estates.  
The older,  censorious,  literature that was discussed in the introduction predicts that  
opportunities  were  created  for  unscrupulous  agents  to  embezzle  and  defraud  owners.  
Conversely, for the revisionists (led by Higman), niches were created for managers to occupy  
with knowledge and energy at least equal to that of their employers. The data discussed above,  
detailing estate characteristics and trends between 1801 and 1829, is not consistent with a  
stagnant plantation economy burdened by management inefficiency.  Cultivation of minor  
staples on smaller plantations declined, concentrating production on larger estates. As shown in  
Figure 6(a), the output mix of molasses and rum was highly responsive to a trade shock in 1822  
following the temporary lifting of restraints on trade with the United States. Also of note is St  
9LQFHQW¶VVXFFHVVIXODQGVSHHG\UHFRYHU\IURPWKHLPSDFWRIDQH[WUHPHYROFDQLFQDWXUDOKD]DUG 
in 1812 (Smith, 2010).  
Results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses dovetail with these descriptive findings  
and provide no evidence to suggest that agents performed less well than owners, on average. The  
OLS-FE results provide no evidence to support the charge of poor agent productivity compared  
to owners, and examination of Figures 7 to 8(b) and the estates that switched to agent operation  
IROORZLQJWKHGHDWKRIRZQHUVZKROHIWQRVXFFHVVRUVKRZVWKDWDOWKRXJKRXWSXWµGLSSHG¶RQ 
some, there was no general downward trend once the agent took over. The regressions that we  
run on the subsample of estates that were owner operated when first observed, instrumenting for  
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the agency variable in Eq.  (1), confirm the qualitative message. As already noted, the results  
of the econometric analysis must be treated with the caution that comes with attempting causal  
inference with historical, non-experimental, data sets, which possess a very limited range of  
variables and which therefore present limited opportunities for the deployment of methods to  
overcome the problem of bias and inconsistency that accompanies the presence of endogenous  
regressors.  
What mechanisms may be responsible for results suggesting that estates under the control of  
agents performed no worse than those supervised by owners?  The introduction outlined  
UHYLVLRQDU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIDJHQF\FHQWUHGRQ+LJPDQ¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHHPHUJHQFHRI 
managerial hierarchies on Jamaica.  Studies of the principal-agent problem elsewhere in the  
Atlantic economy, particularly control systems within chartered companies, demonstrate the  
effectiveness of more efficient contract design and robust accounting techniques in countering  
managerial abuses (Carlos and Nicholas, 1990). There is evidence that similar solutions were  
developed on absentee owned West India plantations. Use of bonds and staged salary rises can  
be documented in Barbados, the closest British colony to St Vincent. On estates operated on  
behalf of the Lascelles family, for example, three-year contracts with graduated performance  
bonuses were offered during the 1790s.  Agents were also required to enter into a bond to  
incentivize good performance.  More broadly across the Caribbean, a combination of higher  
salaries and commission bonuses were being offered by the end of the eighteenth century to  
attract and retain experienced managers (Smith (2006, p. 235-36); Carrington (1999, page 30)).  
Studies of accountancy practices likewise document the appearance of more detailed  
plantation records over this period and the development of specialist bookkeeping staff on larger  
estates. Studies by Higman (2005, p. 94-133), Justin Roberts (2013, 56-68) and Fleischman et al.  
(2011, p.  767-70) examine the appearance of increasingly detailed listings of population  
inventories, along with crop accounts, statements of expenses, and plantation journals recording  
slave work logs.  These authors examine the use of such instruments in monitoring estate  
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performance and guiding owners over decisions such as the acquisition or sale of properties and  
slave  purchases  from  neighbouring  properties. The  flow  of  quantitative  information  
complemented the regular exchange of correspondence between managers and owners.  A  
common feature of the revisionist literature is its reliance on the archival survival of records  
GHVFULELQJDFWLYLWLHVRQSDUWLFXODUSURSHUWLHV+LJPDQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQVIRUH[DPSOHDUHDQFKRUHG 
on two principal Jamaican case studies:  Golden Grove and Montpellier estates.  Roberts  
similarly makes extensive use of plantation journals for selected estates: two Barbadian and two  
Jamaican properties. Our findings complement this research, since the dataset supplies what is  
missing from these studies: repeated sampling of all working plantations within a colony to  
estimate whether entrusting estates to agents attracted a premium or a penalty.  
We are conscious that our results are local to estates on SVG during the early nineteenth 
century and that generalising the findings to other colonies and different periods is risky. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the mature stage of cane cultivation attained on SVG, creating 
conditions potentially ripe for agent misbehaviour, adds to the significance of our findings. 
+HQFHZHFRQVLGHUWKDWRXUUHVXOWVSURYLGHVRPHVXSSRUWWR+LJPDQ¶VDQGRWKHUUHYLVLRQLVWV¶
attempts at rehabilitating the reputation of Caribbean agents, insofar as it relates to the 
productivity of plantations on SVG, during the early nineteenth century.  
 
Appendix: Rental of slaves  
Renting of slaves took place on SVG during the study period, as it did elsewhere in the Caribbean.  
The standard hiring rates on St Vincent during the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries were  
3s per day, £12-16 per year, and £7 per acre (Cateau, 2002, page 105). These rates reflect the three  
main types of hire: daily rates for skilled artisans (mainly in urban settings; Kingstown in the case  
of St Vincent); rental of slaves attached to other estates with surplus labor for periods of several  
months or years; hiring of jobbing gangs to complete specific tasks (for example, woodland  
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clearance, or assistance at peak times such as harvest, or holing cane fields to supplement an 
HVWDWH¶VRZQILHOGJDQJV 
Our evidence for limited use of hired estate labor comes from the registry returns for 1817  
and 1822 and the compensation claims for 1833/34.  The former source indicates that long- 
term rental (at the rate of £12-16 per year) was rare; the latter indicates that the availability of  
jobbing gangs for hire (at the rate of £7 per acre) was also limited. The 1817 registry lists 21,623  
HQVODYHGSHUVRQV2IWKHVHRQO\DUHGHVFULEHGDVµKLUHG¶RQO\DVµOHDVHG¶ZKLOHD 
further 6 are described as beiQJµRIIWKHSURSHUW\¶7KHUHJLVWULHVDOVRHQXPHUDWHGLQGLYLGXDOV 
QRWSHUPDQHQWO\DWWDFKHGWRHVWDWHVEXWZKRZHUHµFXUUHQWO\RQ¶DQDPHGHVWDWH,QWKHUH 
were 23 such registrations, comprising 504 individuals, of whom 104 were currently on a single  
estate: North and South Union in Charlotte Parish (TNA, T71/493). The 1822 registry includes  
22 registrations of this kind, with 95 on Union but not permanently attached to this property  
(TNA, T71/495). Later registries do not give comparable information. For Union, the registry  
returns for 1824, 1827 and 1830 lie within four of the corresponding crop returns.  
Turning to the compensation claims, nearly all awards made by the commissioners in 1833/34  
for claims of 50 or more slaves were for slaves attached to specific estates. The exceptions are  
two Kingstown awards meeting claims arising from maritime businesses. Jobbing gang sizes  
most likely ranged between 10 and 50 slaves. 57 awards falling into this range were made  
outside of Kingstown, providing compensation for a total of 801 enslaved individuals. A further 13 
awards were made for groups within Kingstown, comprising 357 persons. These awards were not 
QHFHVVDULO\IRUUHQWDEOHVODYHV7KHWHUPµMREELQJ¶GRHVQRWDSSHDUDWDOOLQWKHUHFRUGVDQG claimants 
included owners of artisan workshops and suppliers of domestic services, particularly within the 
LVODQG¶VPDLQWRZQ 
The registry and compensation records, therefore, provide a likely upper-bound (c.800) and  
lower-bound (c.325) of the number of hired slaves.  These estimates compare with a total  
population of 21,317 enslaved persons living on estates at the 1817 census date, including  
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12,621 field laborers. Rented slaves are, therefore, equivalent to 1.5 and 3.75 percent of total  
estate population (or 3 and 6 percent of field slaves).  On Jamaica, where jobbing gangs are  
more extensively documented,  Higman estimates that only 6.4 percent of the enslaved  
population of 313,000 were allocated to this type of unit in 1832 (Higman, 1976, page 16). Our 
conclusion is that the lower-bound is the figure most likely to be applicable to St Vincent.13  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis  
 
 
1814-1829 Cobb-Douglas (1817-1827) 
Mean (sd)    Minimum   Maximum Mean (sd)    Minimum   Maximum 
 
Sugar (hogsheads) 178 (138) 4 839 178 (136) 4 632 
Revenue (£) 8378 (6918) 155 50602 7854 (6237) 155 30722 
Slaves 182 (110) 17 689 185 (110) 19 657 
Acres 376 (245) 30 1992 383 (249) 30 1992 
Agency 0.69 (0.46) 0 1 0.70 (0.46) 0 1 
Parishes 
Charlotte 0.24 0 1 0.26 0 1 
Saint George 0.32 0 1 0.30 0 1 
Saint Andrew 0.10 0 1 0.10 0 1 
Saint Patrick 0.15 0 1 0.15 0 1 
Saint David 0.09 0 1 0.09 0 1 
Grenadines 0.10 0 1 0.10 0 1 
 
Owner operated estates (number of observations = 449) (number of observations = 258) 
Sugar (hogsheads) 144 (122) 8 605 144 (125) 8 605 
Revenue (£) 6778 (6160) 265 35049 6261 (5643) 271 30172 
Slaves 162 (78) 18 350 164 (74) 40 345 
Acres 363 (221) 30 1000 371 (225) 30 1000 
Agent operated estates (number of observations = 1005) (number of observations = 595) 
Sugar (hogsheads) 193 (141) 4 839 193 (139) 4 632 
Revenue (£) 9092 (7118) 155 50602 8545 (6359) 155 30722 
Slaves 191 (121) 17 689 194 (121) 19 657 
Acres 382 (255) 82 1992 388 (259) 82 1992 
 
Number of estates (n) 108 (1454) 108 (853) 
 
Notes: Statistics for estate acreage are based on fewer observations than those noted owing to missing values.  
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Table 2: Results of pooled and OLS-FE models  
 
 
 
Output models Revenue models 
 
Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas 
1814-1829 (1817-1827) 1814-1829 (1817-1827) 
Pooled models 
Agency 44.58* 0.12* 2400.00** 0.16** 
(2.55) (2.22) (2.75) (2.87) 
LnSlaves 1.01*** 1.06*** 
(11.30) (12.25) 
LnAcres 0.03 0.03 
(0.38) (0.34) 
Constant 279.18*** -0.30 16686.67*** 3.30*** 
(8.70) (-0.84) (9.76) (9.15) 
 
R
2 0.39 0.81 0.40 0.82 
F (degrees of freedom) 9.01*** (20, 107) 51.60*** (17, 107) 10.11*** (20, 107) 70.59*** (17, 107) 
 
OLS-FE models 
Agency -3.57 0.00 28.60 -0.00 
(-0.61) (0.03) (0.07) (-0.01) 
LnSlaves 0.17 0.23* 
(1.61) (2.24) 
LnAcres 0.13* 0.18*** 
(2.21) (3.49) 
Constant 173.01*** 3.24*** 11607.27*** 6.52*** 
(28.34) (6.39) (25.09) (14.47) 
 
R
2
 (within) 0.07 0.08 0.33 0.29 
F (degrees of freedom) 10.36*** (14, 107) 12.15*** (11, 107) 13.38*** (14, 107) 36.79*** (11, 107) 
 
Number of estates (n) 108 (1454) 108 (853) 108 (1454) 108 (853) 
Notes: Also included but not shown are calendar year dummy variables and controls for estate location 
(the latter for pooled models only). t statistics in parentheses, using standard errors clustered at the unit 
of bservation (estate).  
+ Significant at the 10 percent level, * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 percent level, *** 
Significant at the 0.1 percent level.  
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Table 3: OLS-FE, reduced form and IV-2SLS results for the subsample of estates which were owner-operated when first observed  
 
 
Output models Revenue models 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
OLS-FE   Reduced Form   IV First Stage   IV Second Stage   OLS-FE   Reduced Form   IV Second Stage 
DiedNoSuccessor 5.55 0.66*** 412.38 
(0.50) (10.79) (0.77) 
Agency -8.38 8.38 -713.31 622.14 
(-1.02) (0.50) (-1.61) (0.76) 
 
R
2 0.09 0.09 0.52 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.16 
F (15,41) 5.72*** 6.40*** 176.43*** 6.42*** 5.39*** 5.26*** 5.14*** 
 
Number of estates (n) 42 (560) 
 
Notes: Also included but not shown are calendar year dummy variables and dummy variables for the year of death of an 
owner leaving no natural successor and the year following death.  
t statistics in parentheses, using standard errors clustered at the unit of observation (estate).  
+ Significant at the 10 percent level, * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 percent level, *** 
Significant at the 0.1 percent level.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Greater Caribbean Region (Source: Authors and Bodleian Library, Oxford)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: St. Vincent: river systems, mills and parish boundaries. : I. E. A. Kirby estate mill 
locations that are matched with crop returns; ں: I. E. A. Kirby estate mill locations that are not 
matched with crop returns (Source: St. Vincent National Trust)  
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01jan1801 01jan1806 01jan1811 01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan1826 31jan1829 
Date 
SVG Sugar estates 
St. Vincent Sugar estates, St. Vincent 
Grenadines Sugar estates, Grenadines 
Agent-operated estates  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of estates and number of estates operated by agents on SVG, 1801-1829, based on crop return and registry 
return data. Data for the Grenadines are available from 1804. Notes: (a) closure of the transatlantic slave trade; (b) volcanic 
eruption; (c) trade shock  
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01jan1801 01jan1806 01jan1811 01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan1826 31jan1829 
Date 
SVG Sugar estates 
St. Vincent Sugar estates, St. Vincent 
Grenadines Sugar estates, Grenadines 
Agent-operated estates  
 
 
Figure 4: Number of slaves and number of slaves working for agents on SVG, 1801-1829, based on crop return and registry return  
data. Data for the Grenadines are available from 1804. Notes: (a) closure of the transatlantic slave trade; (b) volcanic eruption; (c)  
trade shock  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01jan1817 01jan1822 01jan1827 
Date 
Acres managed by agents Acres managed by owners 
Sugar output of agents Sugar output of owners 
 
 
Figure 5: Acres managed by agents and owners and sugar output of agents and owners, 1817-1829  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01jan1801 01jan1806 01jan1811 01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan182631jan1829 
Date 
 
Sugar Rum 
Molasses 
 
(a) St. Vincent 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01jan1801 01jan1806 01jan1811 01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan182631jan1829 
Date  
 
Sugar Rum 
Molasses  
 
(b) The Grenadines  
 
Figure 6: Output of sugar, rum and molasses on SVG, 1801-1829, based on crop return data  
(Sugar is measured in hogsheads containing 1,500lbs; rum in puncheons containing 110 imperial  
gallons; molasses in puncheons containing 100 imperial gallons). Vertical scales differ. Notes:  
(a) closure of the transatlantic slave trade; (b) volcanic eruption; (c) trade shock  
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01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan1826 31jan1829 
Date 
Rabacca, Owner Rabacca, Agent 
Cane Wood, Owner Cane Wood, Agent 
Coumacrabou, Owner Coumacrabou, Agent 
Friendship, Owner Friendship, Agent 
 
 
Figure 7: Four estate profiles showing switches in management regime  
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01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan1826 31jan1829 
Date 
Golden Vale, Owner Golden Vale, Agent 
Kingstown Park, Owner Kingstown Park, Agent 
Belvedere, Owner Belvedere, Agent 
 
(a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01jan1816 01jan1821 01jan1826 31jan1829 
Date 
Mount Pleasant (G), Owner Mount Pleasant (G), Agent 
Reversion, Owner Reversion, Agent 
Rose Bank, Owner Rose Bank, Agent 
Kingswood, Owner Kingswood, Agent 
 
(b)  
 
Figure 8: Seven estates on which owner died leaving no natural successor (profile for the eighth such 
estate, Coumacrabou, is shown in Figure 7)  
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